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Effective counterterrorism:  
What have we learned so far? 









The fight against terrorism, in particular of Islamist nature, has become a focus area of foreign and security 
policies in Western countries and around the world. This substantial effort is however only to a limited extent 
matched by adequate evaluations as to its actual success. This paper offers an overview of the counterterrorism 
effectiveness literature in terms of main areas of interest, conceptualisation and operationalisation difficulties as 
well as methodological considerations regarding the types of methods used, validity and reliability evaluations. It 
discusses  the  different  understandings  of  causality  and  proposes  a  working  definition  of  counterterrorism 
effectiveness. We find that a main focus of the literature lies on the impact component of effectiveness, often in 
the sense of a reduction of terrorist attacks in general or a reduction of certain methods of terrorism such as 
suicide attacks.  
Our model article “What Happened to Suicide Bombings in Israel? Insights from a Terror Stock Model” by 
Kaplan et al. (2005) illustrates the above-mentioned issues and reflects the mainstream approach in this field. 
The article uses econometric methods to determine the impact-effectiveness of counter-terrorism and reflects the 
problematique associated with attempts to infer a causal relationship between counterterrorism policies and the 
occurrence of terrorism.  
 
 





1  Introduction 
 
Confronting  terrorism  in  the  Western  world  has  amounted  to  a  substantial 
governmental effort, not least financial. Estimates suggest that the US alone has allocated 
between 2001 and 2011 more than 1 trillion US-dollars to measures and policies related to the 
fight against terrorism (Mueller and Stewart, 2011: 2). 
In  this  context,  an  effectiveness  assessment  would  appear  not  only  warranted  but  also 
necessary. In an often cited meta-analysis, Lum et al. (2006) identified about 20.000 studies 
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on  terrorism,  out  of  which  only  seven  contain  information  on  the  effectiveness  of 
counterterrorism (CT) policies.  Lum et al. concluded at the time that “[t]here has been  a 
proliferation  of  anti-terrorism  programs  and  policies  as  well  as  massive  increases  in 
expenditures toward combating terrorism. Yet, we currently know almost nothing about the 
effectiveness of any of these programs” (Lum et al., 2006: 510). Other authors have also 
accused  the  minor  role  counterterrorism  effectiveness  plays  in  academic  research  (Gold, 
2005: 7; TTSRL, 2007: 28; van Dongen, 2009: 1; Benmelech, et al., 2010: 1).  
On the other hand, the need to learn more on the effectiveness of these measures and on 
intended  and  unintended  side-effects  has  been  repeatedly  formulated  by  scholars  and 
politicians alike.
2 Recently, an increase in interest and research effort in the area could be 
observed  as  illustrated  by  a  limited  number  of  works  dealing  specifically  with 
counterterrorism  effectiveness,
3  as  well  as  a  number  of  research  projects  that  have  been 
launched only recently on this issue.
4 An interesting paper has been produced by van Dongen 
(2009)
5, which details the shortcomings of current research on CT effectiveness. Our own 
paper has greatly benefited from his research, but goes beyond by engaging in an updated, 
comprehensive and critical overview of the literature on CT effectiveness and by offering a 
novel  conceptualisation  of  the  term.  We  also  discuss  methodological  and  measurement 
aspects, as well as the limitations of causality claims.   
The paper first introduces a novel conceptualisation of effectiveness and a first assessment 
of  the  focus  of  research  on  CT  effectiveness.  Within  this  conceptual  framework,  it  then 
proceeds to provide a critical overview of the methods and indicators used. The fourth part 
discusses the issue of establishing causality in CT effectiveness as one of the major challenges 
in this field. The case study provided at the end is meant as an illustration of the main trends, 
achievements and difficulties encountered in researching this topic.  
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(ARC) Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security (CEPS) is funding a regionally-focused project modelling 
the  effectiveness  of  Anti-  and  Counter-terrorist  Strategies  in  Indonesia,  the  Philippines  and  Thailand 
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2  Conceptualising effectiveness 
 
As  already  suggested  in  the  introduction,  CT  programmes  and  measures  have 
proliferated  in  recent  years  and  there  is  also  increasing  awareness  of  the  importance  of 
assessing  their  effectiveness.  Yet  a  generally  accepted  definition  or  framework  of  CT 
effectiveness does not exist in the literature to date (see van Dongen, 2009: 1). What can be 
found is either an assumed conceptual self-evidence or concrete indicators, in the context of a 
proliferation  of  stand-alone  terms  such  as  impact,  success,  consequence,  etc.  However, 
authors have a widely different understanding of the criteria by which certain policies and 
instruments can be considered effective. For the purpose of providing a clear and systematic 
assessment  of  the  literature,  we  propose  the  effectiveness  conceptualisation  developed  by 
Young (2001) in relation to regimes, in the form of output, outcome and impact effectiveness: 
Output  effectiveness  would  refer  to  the  implementation  of  regulations,  policy 
instruments  or  compliance  mechanisms.  For  output  effectiveness,  it  is  the  behaviour  of 
officials alone (those passing the law and the agencies executing the law), in relation to which 
the  effectiveness  of  the  adopted  measures  is  assessed.  Outcome  effectiveness,  in  contrast, 
would particularly cover the direct and measurable effect that these laws have in real life. 
Outcome  effectiveness  would  basically  depend  on  the  behaviour  of  policy-makers 
implementing the measure in the first instance, but also on the behaviour of the targeted group 
in relation to the short-term objectives of a certain CT policy, such as affecting the finance or 
the recruitment pool of a terrorist organisation. The implemented measure might have the 
effect desired or not, also depending on whether the terrorist organisation or group is able to 
find ways around it. Impact effectiveness depends on the behaviour of the targeted audience 
alone  in  relation  to  the  long-term  objective  of  the  CT  policy,  namely  that                          
of reducing or stopping terrorism. It is not the policy-makers or those executing a specific law 
any longer who determine the effectiveness of a policy, but the reaction of the target of such a 
policy, the one that in the end makes a certain policy a success or failure. 
Consider the example of freezing terrorist assets to illustrate this concept: passing a 
bill which allows the freezing of assets suspected to serve terrorist financing purposes would 
be considered as evidence of output effectiveness only and does not inquire into whether these 
measures actually work or not; in other words, one would not look into the intended effects of 
these measures as prescribed by law. Outcome effectiveness is twofold and would firstly refer 
to the short-term objective of such a policy measure, namely freezing terrorist assets. The 
long-term objective of such a policy would aim at draining the resources of terrorist groups.   4 
Impact effectiveness would correspond to the reduction or cessation of the terrorist, violent 
activity of the groups in view as a result of this policy. This example is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 




In order to offer a systematic overview of the CT effectiveness literature and also 
facilitate  a  critical  assessment  of  methods,  measurements  and  causality  claims,  we  will 
structure  the  discussion  in  the  following  according  to  the  proposed  threefold 
conceptualisation. In quantitative terms, the main focus in the literature lies on the impact 
component of effectiveness, often in the sense of a reduction of terrorist attacks in general or a 
reduction  of  certain  methods  of  terrorism  (such  as  suicide  attacks),  while  output-  und 
outcome-effectiveness seem to have played only a minor role (see Figure 2).  
 












Source:  The  total  number  of  studies  evaluated  for  this  article  [38]  distributed  by  main  type  of 
counterterrorism effectiveness according to our three-pronged conceptualisation. Some studies have 
been attributed to several categories. For detailed information on these studies see the Annex. 
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3  Methods used in research on counterterrorism effectiveness 
 
A broad variety of methods have been put to use in the study of CT effectiveness, with 
a clear emphasis on quantitative methods and a focus on impact effectiveness. This is in a 
sense understandable, since the ultimate objective of most policies and measures is to have an 
effect on the level of terrorism and numbers usually offer clearer policy-relevant indicators.  
For  output  effectiveness  qualitative  methods  are  commonly  encountered,  namely 
single and comparative case studies. Alexander (2006) describes CT measures in great detail 
in five selected countries and among others, evaluates the coherence of the implementation of 
legal CT policies as criterion for effectiveness; Monar (2007) looks at the extent to which the 
individual  measures  comprised  in  the  action  plan  of  the  EU  correspond  to  the  threat 
assessment in the strategy and identifies shortcomings related to implementation, integration 
and legitimacy. In a similar approach, the TTSRL project (2008b) evaluates the extent to 
which  counterradicalisation  measures  reflect  the  policy  initiatives  in  the  EU 
counterradicalisation strategy. For the latter, the findings are ambiguous, since, on the one 
hand,  implementation  appears  to  correspond  to  the  policy  objectives  in  view,  yet  are 
considered  insufficient  to  address  the  radicalisation process.  In  this  sense,  the  study  goes 
beyond the intended purpose, since such an assessment reaches in the area of outcome.  
Outcome effectiveness is usually dealt with together with impact effectiveness and 
research here often uses single or multiple case studies. Josiger (2006) discusses the effects of 
the  implementation  of  CT  policies  by  European  governments  (UK,  Spain  and  France  in 
particular), but also considers the reduction in terrorist activity. Byman (2006) looks in detail 
at the effects of targeted killings and takes several outcome indicators, such as the Palestinian 
public opinion support for peace negotiations, the Israeli public morale and support for the 
government, the number of killed terrorists and the disruption of terrorist organisations. Only 
a few studies focus on outcome effectiveness alone; Tsvetovat and Carley (2007) engage for 
instance in a simulation-based experiment focused on the recreation of scenarios of terrorist 
network evolution and assess the efficacy of software programs in terms of accuracy in the 
context of disrupting such networks. The TTSRL project (2008a) attempts, among others, to 
determine the effect of certain CT policies on radicalisation in a sample of European countries 
using,  among  others,  expert  interviews  as  a  method.  This  study  particularly  makes  an 
assessment on whether or not CT measures produced radicalisation as an unintended side-
effect based on interviews with experts.   6 
The  overall  largest  category  of  CT  effectiveness  studies,  those  dealing  with  impact 
effectiveness, uses both quantitative and qualitative methodologies, whereby the majority are 
quantitative;  they  establish  correlations  between  counterterrorism  measures  and  expected 
effects in the sense of reducing or stopping terrorist activity altogether.
6 
A comparatively small body of literature has applied descriptive statistics often with a 
before-after comparison.
7 Such a comparison contrasts a situation prior to a specific event to a 
consecutive one and tries to argue that variations may be attributed to the occurrence of this 
specific event. Hewitt (1984), for instance, analyses the effect of a number of CT measures 
(negotiations, reforms, etc.) for the case of five terrorist groups, mainly located in Europe 
with mostly simple correlations and before-and-after comparisons. Prunckun and Mohr (1997) 
discuss the effect of the April 1986 US air raid on Libya (Operation El Dorado). The level of 
activity of terrorist groups particularly linked to Libya, and the frequency of attacks against 
US  targets  –  before  and  after  the  US  military  intervention  –  are  taken  as  indicators  to 
determine  the  effectiveness  of  this  particular  military  intervention.  Decreasing  levels  of 
terrorism after the US intervention are taken as evidence that the US policy may have been 
effective  and  acted  as  a  deterrent.  In  a  similar  study,  Collins  (2004)  addresses  the 
effectiveness of US policies (military force, unilateral sanctions, and multilateral sanctions) to 
dissuade state support for terrorism, by using as indicator the frequency of Libyan-supported 
terrorist attacks before and after the US interventions had taken place. Similar to Prunckun 
and  Mohr  (1997),  he  finds  that  US  military  action  apparently  reduced  the  frequency  of 
terrorist  incidents  in  the  aftermath  of  the  intervention.  He  adds  however,  that,  as  a 
countervailing  effect,  the  intensity  of  terrorist  attacks  did  actually  remarkably  increase. 
Multilateral sanctions in contrast are found to have been more effective as Libya dismantled 
its terrorist support program as an apparent result.  
A  relatively  larger  number  of  studies  have  used  regression  analysis.
8  Among  the 
methods used here has been intervention analysis where the “intervention”-effect of a certain 
CT policy is evaluated. This method has been widely applied in order to determine the impact 
of a specific policy or incident on a time series. Much tribute has been paid to a study by 
Enders and Sandler (1993). The authors apply intervention analysis (to measure the impact of 
US  interventions  on  the  number  of  terrorist  attacks)  which  is  combined  with  a  vector-
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2006; Harcourt, 2006; Pratto et al., 2009. 
7 Cf. Prunckun and Mohr, 1997; Collins 2004; Malvesti 2002; Perlinger, Pedahzur and Zalmanovitch 2005. 
8 Cf. Enders, Sandler, 1993/2009; Pratto et al. 2009, Barros, 2003; Hafez and Hatfield, 2006; Dugan et al., 2009; 
Brophy-Baermann and Conybeare, 1994; Drakos and Giannakopoulos, 2009; Kaplan and Mintz, 2005; Beasley, 
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autoregression  (to  illustrate  the  interdependency  of  terrorists’  options  and  to  identify 
substitution and complementary effects) in order to determine the effectiveness of certain US 
CT  policies.  Intervention  analysis  is  also  used  by  other  researchers  to  evaluate  the 
effectiveness of certain CT measures.
9  
Cox hazard modelling is an alternative method that has often been used in this field. 
Cox hazard models are survival regression models used to model the estimated time before a 
certain event occurs based on a number of explanatory variables. Studies on counter-terrorism 
effectiveness have used this method to determine the likelihood/occurrence of future terrorist 
attacks as a function of CT measures.
10 
The most often encountered qualitative methods are, again, single and comparative 
case  studies  (Brown,  2007;  Duyvesteyn  2008).  For  some  of  these  studies,  however, 
effectiveness is only considered as a side-aspect (Della Porta, 1992, Bonner 1992). Ashour  
(2008) engages in a comparative case study of group deradicalisation, where deradicalisation 
means ideological and behavioural abandonment of violence – dismantlement of the armed 
groups  and  abandonment  of  jurisprudence  justifying  violence  and  identifies  three  CT 
measures  as  independent  variables:  state  repression,  selective  incentives  and  charismatic 
leadership  that  would  together  reduce  the  likelihood  of  groups  re-engaging  in  terrorism. 
Another  (widely  neglected)  qualitative  method  used  in  the  study  of  impact  effectiveness 
comes  with  interview  methods.  There  is  however  hardly  evidence  that  scholars  are 
increasingly  applying  such  methods  to  study  CT  effectiveness.  Only  one  study  has  been 
identified which explicitly draws on interview techniques to identify the effect of counter-
terrorism measures. Araj (2008) uses 88 interviews with senior leaders of Palestinian political 




4  Measuring Counterterrorism Effectiveness 
 
Measurement is a fundamental aspect of effectiveness assessment, in particular given 
the large number of quantitative studies in the area, and one which is particularly problematic, 
given the difficulties to establish the reliability and validity of indicators. This is related to the 
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often  overlooked  correspondence  of  measures  –  elaboration  and  implementation  of 
legislation, disruption of terrorist activity - to the definition of the threat. As Ganor (2005: 
102) argues: “In order to examine the effectiveness of the […] action we must first define the 
goals underlying these initiatives, and decide whether these goals can be achieved using the 
methods and means chosen”. Clearly, such methods and means need to correspond to the 
characteristics of the phenomenon to be addressed: nature, manifestation, modus operandi, 
and not least causes. This is most relevant for the policy area of counterradicalisation, where 
understanding  the  conditions  and  drivers  of  radicalisation  is  essential  for  any  attempt  to 
combat it. TTSRL (2008b) assesses the EU counterradicalisation strategy based on a complex 
model  of  radicalisation  factors,  which  are  then  compared  with  legal  provisions  and 
implementation in the UK and the Netherlands. Several authors point out the relevance of the 
nature of the threat (Ullman 2006; Simon) and the characteristics of the terrorist organisation 
in view (Malvesti, 2002).  
A related aspect that influences the validity and reliability of indicators would be the 
comprehensive  and  systematic  consideration  of  CT  measures.  While  the  range  of  such 
measures is quite large – targeted killings, air strikes, economic sanctions, fortification and 
socioeconomic  reforms,  etc.,  most  studies  deal  with  individual  measures  only  or  with  a 
convenient selection thereof. Some of the individual measures examined are for instance: 
legislation  criminalising  acts  as  terrorism  and  the  increase  in  law  enforcement  powers 
(Omotola, 2008); assassinations (Zussman and Zussman, 2006), racial profiling (Harcourt, 
2006), or data mining (Jonas and Harper, 2006). In terms of convenient selection, examples 
are  defensive  barriers,  roving  patrols,  security  barriers,  assassination  of  terrorist  leaders, 
infiltration of terrorist organisations, closing off of channels of funding (Morag, 2005); hostile 
actions,  strikes/killings  or  terrorists,  arrest,  detaining  or  questioning,  release  of  terrorist 
operatives,  entering  enemy  territory,  confiscation  of  goods/funds,  foiling  terrorist  attacks, 
sweeps/searches (Pratto, 2009: 4, 6-7). Hewitt (1984) offers a classification attempt, yet along 
largely unclear criteria; he looks at ceasefire and negotiations, economic conditions, making 
reforms, emergency powers and anti-terrorist legislation, the use of security forces. Finally, in 
some cases counterterrorism measures are not named in concrete terms but taken as a whole 
in cost-benefit assessments (Zycher, 2003; Stewart and Mueller, 2009).  
The above mentioned difficulties primarily apply to outcome and impact effectiveness. 
Indicators  for  output-effectiveness  are  usually  unproblematic  as  they  simply  refer  to  the 
establishment of authorities (Alexander, 2006), the production of strategies, legislation and 
organisation  reform  in  the  counterterrorism  field  (9/11  Commission  report,  2006),  or  the   9 
implementation of legislation, such as that of  EU Counterterrorism directives in the Member 
States of the European Union (Keohane, 2005).  
Outcome-effectiveness has been approached in the literature through the intermediary 
of  a  variety  of  indicators.  The  main  problems  here  are  the  lack  of  systematisation, 
convenience  selection  and  a  certain  vagueness  as  to  whether  certain  elements  should  be 
considered as indicators or side-effects. An obvious way to systematise indicators would be 
by  root  causes  of  terrorism  and  operational  ability  of  the  targeted  organisation:  the  latter 
might include capabilities (resources), recruitment, public support (here ideology and hearts 
and minds) national (constituency) and international. Yet, most studies classify in the second 
category, and usually take only one or some (operational) aspects under consideration.  
An example of single operational aspects taken under consideration is  Della Porta 
(1992), who finds that “the number of terrorist […] arrests [can be taken] as an indicator of 
state  success”  and  hence  its  effectiveness.  Morag  (2005)  uses  seven  parameters  in  the 
categories ‘human life’, ‘economic resources’, ‘political resources’. Byman (2003) refers to 
the level of domestic support for counterterrorist operations, terrorist recruitment, operational 
freedom and the disruption of the adversary’s command and control structure. Perl (2005) 
focuses on the elements of terrorist infrastructure and terrorist capabilities. Spencer (2006) 
suggests that counter-terrorism measures may be considered effective if they help to reduce 
the popular fear of terrorism. Farley (2003: 407) finds that terrorist groups may be fought by 
breaking chains of command, “that is […] every possible line of communication between 
leaders  and  foot  soldiers”.  A  study  that  uses  a  more  comprehensive  set  of  indicators  is 
provided by Malvesti (2002) who argues that one needs to focus on the ‘critical nodes’ in a 
terrorist  infrastructure:  financial  networks,  weapons,  documents,  political  base, 
communication channels, intelligence network, sanctuary, cells and leadership.  
In sum, scholars have used a variety of indicators to study outcome-effectiveness; and 
as  a  consequence,  have  come  to  very  different  views  on  how  effective  counter-terrorism 
policies are. 
The issue of select indicators (human rights, popular support, economic consequences) 
being considered on occasion as indicators or side-effects is illustrated in Table 1 below. An 
assessment of what constitutes an effective CT policy may thus differ significantly depending 
on whether certain indicators are weighted more intensively or not. For example, if negative 
economic consequences of CT measures are only considered as a side-aspect in determining 
effectiveness,  harsh  measures  which  help  to  arrest  potential  terrorists  but  pose  a  heavy 
economic burden still might be considered effective. If, in contrast, the economic impact of   10 
CT  measures  is  more  centrally  considered  at  and  significantly  flows  in  the  evaluation  of 
effectiveness, the same measures might be evaluated more critically. 
 
Table 1  Use of indicators within the study of the effectiveness of CT-policies 
  As a primary indicator  As a side-effect 
Civil rights / human rights 
 
Josiger, 2006; Guiora, 2008; 
Harcourt, 2006. 
Hewitt, 1984; Jonas and Harper, 
2006; Eisele, 2006; Omotola, 2006; 
Perl, 2007. 
Civilian casualties  Guiora, 2008.  Morag, 2005; Beasley, 2008. 
Domestic support 
 
Byman, 2003; van Dongen, 2009.  Morag, 2005. 
(negative) Economic impact  Zussman and Zussman, 2006.  Brück, 2008; Walkenhorst and 
Dihel, 2002; Frey, Lüchinger et al. 
2004. 
 
An interesting analytical question is posed by the issue of the respect for human rights 
in the fight against terrorism. Some authors approach its breach as a negative consequence or 
side-effect of counterterrorism policy (Malinovski, 2008). If, however, the respect for human 
rights can be linked to the idea of public support and therefore legitimacy of the government 
engaging  in  counterterrorism,  one  could  in  fact  extend  the  element  of  public  support  as 
applicable not only to the terrorist organisation and its constituency, but also to that of the 
state government, thus influencing the overall impact. One would speak in this sense of a 
‘balance of legitimacy’ which may help a state to raise public support through a well-designed 
counter-terrorism policy. State policies may however also boost the human capital of the 
terrorist  organisation  and  sabotage  state  efforts  to  combat  it  in  case  the  former  has  lost 
legitimacy through the breach of one of its most important functions – upholding the rule of 
law.  Brown  (2007)  argues,  for  instance,  that  reinforced  police  actions  have  the  opposite 
outcome to the one desired: public hostility towards the police and support for the terrorists or 
at  least  less  of  a  willingness  to  cooperate  with  the  authorities.  Mertus  and  Sajjad  (2008) 
similarly note that human rights abuses determine the de-legitimisation of the agent fighting 
terrorism.  Duyvesteyn  (2008)  warns  against  the  use  of  military  force  as  a  case  of  the 
government being provoked into overreacting, which confirms the discourse of the terrorist 
organisation. In a study on Israeli CT policies, Pedahzur and Perliger (2010) claim that these 
policies increasingly limit basic civil and political rights and even more lead to an increase in 
Palestinian animosity toward Israel.   
Impact-effectiveness is measured by indicators related to terrorist activity: number of 
attacks,  recidivism  rates  for  deradicalisation  programmes  of  individuals  (Boucek,  2008; 
Noricks,  2009)  and  the  degree  of  abandonment  of  violence  in  the  case  of  group 
deradicalisation (Ashour, 2008). Horgan and Braddock (2010: 283) propose a more elaborated   11 
model of assessment, the Multi Attribute Utility Technology, with two sets of indicators: the 
rate  of  terrorism,  and  subordinated  domestic  terror  rates  and  recidivism;  and  second  the 
domestic  esteem  of  the  government:  boosted  morale  and  political  capital.  A  major  issue 
within this category of effectiveness is the limited amount and reliability of data, for instance 
the accurate tracking and reporting of re-arrests in the case of recidivism (Noricks, 2009). In 
the case of the Saudi deradicalisation programme, for instance, Boucek (2008) notes that the 
individuals going through the programme were in fact minor offenders, which weakens to a 
great degree the accuracy  of its declared success. Finally,  a large number of studies use, 
instead of impact, outcome indicators such as the number of the killed and arrested terrorists 
and the destruction of the terrorist infrastructure.
11 The frequent use of the number of killed or 
arrested terrorists as an indicator is particularly problematic; since these individuals can easily 
be replaced, their number does not necessarily say much about the entirety and the size of a 
terrorist organisation and therefore about the effect on terrorist groups and the number of 
future attacks.
12  
Some of the issues addressed above can be traced to the challenge of gathering and 
using reliable and comprehensive data, especially relevant for quantitative studies. The field 
has generally and for a long time been plagued by a considerable lack of reliable data both on 
terrorism and counter-terrorism policies (Drakos, 2009; Benmelech, et al., 2010). There are 
currently  only  a  few  comprehensive  databases  of  terrorist  incidents,  among  which  the 
“International  Terrorism:  Attributes  of  Terrorist  Events”  (ITERATE)  and  the  Global 
Terrorism Database (GTD). These datasets have come under criticism, however, in terms of 
completeness and varying definitions of terrorist incidents. National datasets, in particular for 
the case of Israel seem to be more reliable. To overcome these difficulties of insufficient or 
unreliable data, researchers have regularly tried to supplement and combine existing datasets. 
Hafez and Hatfield (2006) for instance, collect incidents published in prominent media which 
is complemented by data from the Israeli based International Policy Institute for Counter-
Terrorism (ICT).  
As a final note to this section, we need to mention that there are a minority of studies 
which, while making claims of effectiveness analysis, do not actually provide any indicators 
for its measurement. Laffiteau (2009: 12-13) argues for instance that “[m]any of the initial 
steps taken by the US in the wake of the 9/11 al Qaeda terrorist attacks were appropriate, 
albeit expensive, counter-terrorism measures […]. Multilateral efforts to identify and freeze al 
Qaeda’s  and  other  terrorist  groups’  financial  resources  was  yet  another  step  in  the  right 
                                                 
11 Compare for instance, Guiora, 2008, Schmid and Sing, 2008, Floros and Newsome, 2009. 
12 See Byman, 2003: 1; Probst, 2005: 320; Spencer, 2006: 186; Stohl, 2006: 12 on this issue.   12 
direction“. Yet he offers no basic criteria by which such statements could be assessed. Or, 
Alexander (2006: 211) argues that counterterrorism measures in Germany have been mostly 
effective, but that at the same time “[f]or example, the preemptive “grid search” capabilities 
have, thus far, proven ineffective,“ without explaining why this is the case.   
 
 
5  Causality in CT effectiveness  
 
There  are  various  understandings  of  causality  in  the  CT  effectiveness  literature, 
depending on the methodological approach and methods used. Whereas in qualitative studies 
causality is often assumed but not discussed, quantitative studies take a more differentiated 
view. Studies using analytical statistics, if at all, tend to cautiously suggest that correlative 
patterns of relations, identified in their study, may say something about a causal link. Some of 
the studies using descriptive statistics similarly make clear that correlative patterns or changes 
based  on  a  before-after-comparison  do  not  at  all  make  it  necessary  to  speak  of  a  causal 
relationship (cf. Prunckun and Mohr, 1997). In other studies, claims of causality are made as 
for the study of Collins (2004) who tries to link the effect of sanctions to Libyan behavior. 
Similarly,  Frisch  (2005)  claims  to  determine  the  impact  of  Israeli  CT  measures  through 
indicators such as Israeli casualities through terrorist attacks, the number of Palestinian terror 
attacks etc. before  and  after those CT measures were implemented. Hewitt (1984) makes 
causal claims of CT measures such as anti-terrorist legislation through simple correlation and 
before-and-after comparisons of the level of terrorism. Such causal chains are, however, not 
always convincing particularly if we keep in mind the so called attribution problem.   
The attribution problem refers to the question whether effects are the result of policy 
measures or of some other exogenous factors (cf. Byman, 2003; Probst, 2005; Stohl, 2006; 
Spencer,  2006;  Perl,  2007;  Van  Dongen,  2009).  In  practice  this  means  identifying  and 
measuring the impact of control variables (Miller, 2007: 337). For output effectiveness this 
translates into the question whether legislation is the result of policy statements and strategies 
or  of  other  factors,  such  as  organisational  interests  for  instance.  Analysing  outcome  and 
impact  effectiveness  would  imply  considering  a  series  of  control  variables,  such  as  other 
measures, geographical, economic, political and cultural conditions. Ullman (2006: 30) lists a 
series of such conditions: organisational factors, strategic paradigm shift, and alliance politics. 
Attribution  is  especially problematic  in  the  case  of  impact  effectiveness.  A  critique  often 
brought to process tracing, expert analyses and econometric approaches is the fact that effects   13 
remain probabilistic, since the real cause for an observed effect may be a number of other 
factors and not necessarily the actual counterterrorism measure (Van Dongen, 2009: 8). In 
other words, the question is whether through the various measures the terrorist organisation 
changes behaviour in the sense of not engaging in attacks anymore or adapts and finds other 
ways and means to continue its activity in spite of the disruption. For instance, a reduction in 
the number of terror attacks could be traced to the terror groups’ strategic thinking, such as 
the reallocation of resources for the preparation of a more elaborated attack, or to internal 
rivalry within terror groups.
13 Enders and Sandler (1993) give the example of the measure of 
protecting embassies correlated with reduced attacks on them, which just reflects a switch in 
the operational focus, i.e. targeting other objectives. Targeted killings may interfere with the 
operational abilities of terrorist groups and in this way reduce the number of terrorist attacks. 
However, assassinating members of terrorist groups may also trigger revenge and ultimately 
increase  the  level  of  terrorism.  Both  are  possible  and  cannot  be  derived  from  theoretical 
assumptions. Instead, as Jaeger and Paserman conclude, [a]ll of these factors suggest that 
whether targeted killings and suicide attacks raise or lower the level of violence is ultimately 
an  empirical  question  (Jaeger  and  Paserman,  2007:  6).  This points  out  a  central problem 
underlying  efforts  to  establish  causality.  The  effectiveness  of  CT  is  largely  an  empirical 
question and therefore hardly one that can be dealt with from a theoretical standpoint. This is 
because both  intended  and  unintended  consequences  of  certain  CT  measures  can  only be 
derived to a certain extent from a theoretical framework and only if we operate on certain (for 
instance rational) premises.  
Several solutions have been offered to the attribution problem, yet all of them not 
satisfactory, so that we can at the moment only speak in plausibility terms, when referring to 
the effect of various measures. Van Dongen introduces the concept of program theory, which 
largely resembles the method of process tracing. By breaking up a counter-terrorism measure 
and  its  assessment  of  effectiveness  into  certain  components  and  theoretically  establishing 
likely causal links between cause and effect of these components, van Dongen hopes to at 
least  partially  solve  the  attribution  problem  and  to  determine  the  effectiveness  of  such  a 
measure. In general, the idea of establishing the causal chain of cause and effects of certain 
aspects of a counter-terrorism measure seems promising, since effects can more convincingly 
be accounted for. However, as van Dongen himself admits, establishing such a causal chain 
would be complicated considering the multi-level effects of a counter-terrorism policy, and 
                                                 
13 Cf. Bonner, 1992: 200; Spencer, 2006: 185; Perl, 2007: 1; Miller, 2007: 337.   14 
additionally is bound to subjectivity, since there is no generally accepted standard for linking 
components of CT measures.  
 Another  possible  solution  to  this  attribution  problem  would  be  the  use  of 
counterfactuals.  The  only  such  study  available  to  date  that  uses  a  counterfactual  is  one 
produced by Enders, Sandler und Arce (2009), in which the effectiveness of the INTERPOL 
is assessed through a counterfactual. The authors use as proxy the number of arrests in the EU 
executed with the help of the INTERPOL. As observed by the authors: “The most challenging 
calculation  for  this  study  is  to  compute  INTERPOL’s  counterterrorism  benefits,  since  it 
involves a counterfactual: i.e., how many more transnational terrorist incidents and associated 
casualties would there have been had INTERPOL coordinating actions not taken place. This 
is challenging because this counterfactual is obviously not observable”.  
The use of counterfactuals is difficult to conduct and usually makes necessary the 
comparison  with  a  counterfactual  outcome  that  has  not been  shaped by  counter-terrorism 
measures. „Truly to abnegate the null hypothesis you would need to set up two worlds, one in 
which nothing was done about terrorism and one in which "war" was declared, and see which 
version suffered more” (Tudge, 2004: 2).
14  
Since  counterfactuals  are  difficult  and  often  not  even  possible  to  conduct,  an 
alternative approach would be to increase the effort of identifying control variables such as 
political and cultural specificities. Byman (2006) raises the issue of the relativity to political 
culture and geopolitics. In other words, one and the same measure might work in one country 
but  not  in  another,  such  as  in  the  case  of  Israel  and  the  United  States.  For  the  latter, 
considerations such as the location of the enemy and its connection to states, as well as the 
impact  on  the  international  status  as  “upholder  of the  rule  of  law”  (p.  106)  would  make 
targeted killings a less useful solution or at least one which is more difficult to legitimise. 
Methods to identify such variables would be interviews and surveys, for instance. This of 
course would not solve the attribution problem completely, as there would always be the 
possibility of certain circumstances not yet having been considered. The claim to causality 
would therefore also be in the area of plausibility. This type of approach would however 
significantly increase our understanding and especially provide a richer list of tested means of 
action for policy makers.    
 
                                                 
14 Similar views can be found in Spencer (2006): “[I]t is difficult to confirm the absence of an occurrence and 
assign causality to that absence” and  Gold (2005) “It may, of course, be hard to evaluate effectiveness, since it is 
difficult to measure the number and size of terrorist operations that are not undertaken because of effective 
deterrence”.   15 
6  Illustrative study 
 
In the academic literature, the effectiveness of Israeli counter-terrorism measures and 
of  targeted  killings  in  particular  has  been  extensively  studied.  One  of  these  studies  was 
produced by Kaplan et al. (2005):
 What Happened to Suicide Bombings in Israel? Insights 
from a Terror Stock Model.
15  
This  article  allows  us  to  illustrate  many  of  the problems  surrounding  the  issue  of 
assessing  the  effectiveness  of  counter-terrorism  policies.  A  particular  focus  is  on  the 
attribution problem and possible ways to solve it. Additionally, this paper is thematically in 
line with much of the literature; concerning both the types of methods used and the choice of 
the case study.  
In their paper, the authors attempt to determine the effect of Israeli CT measures on 
the number of Palestinian suicide bombings which, in line with most quantitative work clearly 
reflects an interest in impact-effectiveness. The data on Israeli CT measures and Palestinian 
suicide  bombings  used  covers  a  comparatively  short  period  of  time  (2001  –  2003).  The 
authors particularly rely on data from B’tselem, the Israeli Information Center for Human 
Rights in the Occupied Territories, which has collected extensive data on the conflict, on 
terrorist incidents and related casualties in particular. Unlike studies that exclusively rely on 
the major datasets on terrorism, this is based on national data which is likely to be more 
comprehensive and accurate. The findings indicate that preventive arrests rather than targeted 
killings seem to be more effective in reducing suicide bombings. 
Similar to many quantitatively based studies on CT effectiveness, the authors start 
with a theoretical concept from which they derive plausible correlative relationships. Kaplan 
et al. (2005) suggest that the patterns of suicide attacks in Israel are directly linked to Israeli 
CT measures insofar as they affect the killing of suspected terrorists and recruitment of new 
terrorists. This is conceptualised in what they call the “terror stock model”, with the “stock” 
of terror comprising (particularly) the number of recruits available for the terrorist group. The 
model directly links the number of suicide bombings to the (supposed) number of terrorists 
available to plan and execute such violent attacks. In other words; if groups are likely to have 
a high inflow of recruits willing to blow themselves up, increasing levels of suicide terrorism 
are to be expected. While such argumentation may help to estimate the size and capabilities of 
terrorist groups, it may be criticised for its simplification. Obviously, the size of terrorist 
                                                 
15 Published in Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 28:225–235, 2005.   16 
groups does not always directly relate to their use of violence, since groups might not always 
use all resources available, something that the model presumes however. 
The paper suggests that Israeli CT measures have an ambivalent effect on the terror 
stock and therefore do not necessarily reduce the pattern of suicide bombings. On the one 
hand, the killing of (alleged) terrorists and other measures such as preventive arrests is likely 
to diminish the resources and may also lead to fewer incidents of suicide bombings. On the 
other hand, the killing of Palestinian militants and uninvolved civilian is likely to increase 
opposition  to  Israeli  politics  and  to  increase  the  number  of  those  committed  to  the  fight 
against Israel which would then increase the pool of terrorist recruits. The attribution problem 
can be clearly be observed here – the fact that other factors which may have an impact on the 
number of suicide attacks (such as internal rivalry) are not extensively studied or accounted 
for. 
Since suicide bombings are a (comparatively) rare event, their occurrence is modelled 
as  a  Poisson  distribution.  The  non-linear  relationship  between  CT  measures  and  suicide 
bombings is then estimated based on various recruitment rates (independent of Israeli CT 
measures/dependent  on  targeted  assassinations).  The  findings  of  the  regression  analysis 
indicate that the policy of targeted assassinations does not seem to have reduced the number 
of suicide bombings, as opposed to the policy of arresting terror suspects. Interestingly, the 
authors discuss the problematique of establishing causality from these correlative patterns.  
 
“Although the analysis thus far has established a strong, positive statistical association between targeted 
hits and suicide bombing attempts via terror stock recruitment, is it plausible to treat this association as 
causal? Suppose that in a given month, terrorists select four different days on which to attempt suicide 
bombings in Israeli cities, but that Israeli intelligence agents obtain precise information regarding these 
plans. Suppose further that upon learning of these plans, Israeli authorities order targeted hits to prevent 
the bombings, but that only two hits are successful in doing so. At the end of the month, data would 
report that there were hits on four days, that there were suicide bombings following two of these hits, 
and that there were no suicide bombings on any other days. A statistical analysis of these data would 
suggest that hits were positively associated with suicide bombings, even though hits actually cut the 
number of suicide bombings in half.”  
 
To  rule  out  the  possibility  of  a  misleading  correlation,  the  authors  use  more 
differentiated data on successful targeted assassinations (which killed those targeted) and non-
successful hits (when the target was not hit). The argument made here is that “[i]f the positive 
association between suicide bombing attempts and (via recruiting) targeted hits estimated in 
this analysis is an artifact of the timing of hits intended to disrupt bombings, this effect should   17 
be much stronger for botched hits that failed to kill those targeted than for on-target hits, and 
thus  detectable  in  the  data.”  In  other  words,  if  the  (timing  of  the)  execution  of  suicide 
bombings was chosen prior to any CT measures and thus did not depend upon CT behaviour, 
simple  logic  suggests  that  we  would  then  experience  a  stronger  (positive)  relationship 
between botched hits and the number of suicide bombings when compared to successful hits 
and  suicide  bombings.  In  contrast  to  that,  if  patterns  of  suicide  bombings  are  (at  least 
partially) determined by CT measures, we would not experience different correlations here. 
Results actually indicate that a differential effect of successful vs. non-successful targeted 
assassinations does not exist, which supports the idea that targeted killings actually increase 
the number of suicide attacks. 
Similar to many studies that use quantitative methods, the authors are reluctant to say 
something  about  a  clearly  established  path  of  causality.  They  rather  make  clear  that  the 
statistical relations uncovered are not definitive. 
 
 
7  Conclusion 
 
  While effectiveness could be regarded as one of the most, if not the most important 
aspect  in  counterterrorism  policy,  not  just  academically  but  also  politically,  its  study  is 
plagued by both theoretical underdevelopment and a lack of methodological grounding. This 
contribution has attempted to provide a workable conceptualisation and operationalisation of 
counterterrorism effectiveness in the form of output, outcome and impact effectiveness and 
map out the various methodological approaches used in the literature. Thematically, there is a 
broad  variety  of  measures  taken  under  consideration  and  in  various  classifications,  from 
comprehensive strategies to groups of measures and individual ones, such as targeted killings. 
Quantitative methods are overrepresented in the literature, while methods such as interviews 
or survey have not been exploited to their actual potential, in particular for the purposes of 
identifying control variables. The ever increasing methodological complexity corresponds to 
little progress in terms of findings, with a few exceptions such as the model study presented. 
We offered an overview of the types of indicators used to assess effectiveness and identified a 
series of validity and reliability problems, which can be one of the reasons for partly divergent 
results obtained. Also an important aspect to mention here is that of data availability and 
quality, as well as the ever enduring issue of lack of empirical data, common to most areas of 
terrorism research. Finally, we addressed the concept of causality as understood in the various   18 
methodological  approaches  and  concluded  on  plausibility  as  a  more  adequate 
conceptualisation. The attribution problem has also been identified as an unresolved issue, 
which in turn can be traced to the insufficient exploration of concurrent and competing factors 
apart from the CT as such. As a direction for future research, we pointed out the lack of 
qualitative empirical research to identify conditions to be operationalised in control variables, 
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8  Annex 
 
Table 2  Understanding of effectiveness of CT measures in academic studies 
 
Paper  Policy / instrument  Output  Outcome  Impact 
9/11 Commission 
(2006) 
Several  (legal, 
judicial,  police, 
military, aid) 
-  Disruption  of 
terrorist 
organisation  (on 
various  levels)  and 
increase  of  target 
security  
Attack occurrence 
Alexander (2006)  Various  Establishment  of  a 
counter-terrorism 
department/structure 
of CT agencies 
   
Araj (2008)  “State  repression” 
(targeted killings) 
-  -  Effect  on  suicide 
bombings 
 
Ashour (2008)  Deradicalisation 
programmes  
-  -  Level of violence 
 
Barros (2003)  Various  (political, 
economic effects) 
-  -  Effect  on 
assassinations  and 
kidnappings 
Beasley (2008)  Violent,  non-violent, 
and socioeconomic  
-  -  Rate  of  suicide 
terror attacks 
Benmelech  et  al. 
(2010) 
House  demolitions 
by Israel 
-  -  Palestinian  suicide 
terror attacks 
Block (2005)  French CT measures  -  Disruption  of 
terrorist attacks 
Prevention  of 
terrorist attacks 
Boucek (2008)  Deradicalisation 
programme 




Israeli retaliations  -  -  Level  of  terrorist 
attacks 
 
Brown (2007)  Aggressive  tactics, 
invasive  techniques, 
racial profiling 
-  -  Reduction  of  the 
threat of terrorism 
Byman (2006)  Targeted  killings, 
fence erection 
-  Disruption  of 
terrorist 
organisations, 
public  morale, 
prevention  of 
movement, etc. 
Number  of  Israeli 
fatalities 
 
Collins (2004)  Military  force, 
unilateral  economic 
sanctions  and 
multilateral sanctions 
against  states  which 
provide  support  for 
terrorist groups 
-  -  Impact  on  state-
supported terrorism 
measured  by 
number  of 
individuals killed  
Drakos  and 
Giannakopoulos 
(2009) 
In  general  terms: 
measures that stop a 
terrorist incident 
 
-  Probability  that  a 
terrorist  incident  is 
stopped  by 
authorities 
 
Dugan et al. (2009)  British  interventions 
(curfew  and  search 
operations) 
-  -  Impact  on  the  risk 
of new attacks 
Duyvesteyn (2008)  Use of armed force  -  -  Reduction  of 
terrorist activity   22 
Enders and Sandler 
(1993) 
Metal  detectors  at 
airports,  fortifying 
embassies, etc. 
-  -  Level  of  terrorist 
attacks 
Enders et al. (2009)  Interpol’s  proactive 
measures 
-  -  Level  of  terrorist 
attacks 
Frisch (2006)  Offensive  and 
defensive  measures 
(targeted  killings, 
building wall) 
-  Palestinian arrests  Number  of 
Palestinian  attacks, 
Israeli fatalities 




-  -  Level of terrorism 
Hewitt (1984)  Various  (ceasefires 
&  negotiations  with 
terrorists,  improving 
economic conditions, 
making  reforms, 
collective 
punishments, 
emergency  powers, 
the  use  of  the 
security forces) 






-  -  Terror  level, 
recidivism 
Josiger (2006)  Various,  including 




-  balance  of  security  [reduction  of 
terrorism]  with  the  protection  of  civil 
liberties 
Kaplan  and  Mintz 
(2005) 
Targeted killings and 
preemptive arrests 
-  -  Rate  of  suicide 
attacks 
Kober (2007)  Targeted killings    Resources (recruits) 
of terrorists 
Number  of 
Palestinian  terrorist 
attacks 
Keohane (2005)  EU cooperation  Degree  of  EU 
cooperation; shift of 
power to the EU 
-  - 
Malinovski (2008)  Torture, 
extraordinary 
rendition,  military 
courts,  indefinite 
detention  without 
trial 
-  Recruitment 
capability  through 
delegitimation  of 
the enemy’s values 
- 
Malvesti (2002)  Military air strikes  -  -  Prevention  of 
terrorism 
Mertus and Sajjad 
(2008) 
Judicial  and  legal 
measures  infringing 
on human rights 
-  -  Reduction  of  
terrorism 
Monar (2007)  EU strategy  Action  plan  to 
combat terrorism 
-  - 
Noricks (2009)  Deradicalisation and 
disengagement 
programmes 
-  -  Recidivism 
Paser and 
Jaegerman (2007) 
Targeted killings  -  -  Level of terrorism 
Perlinger et al. 
(2005) 
Defensive model of 
coping with 
terrorism 
-  -  Terror  incident 
damage (number of 
victims) 
Prunckun Jr., and 
Mohr (1997) 
 
Operation El Dorado 
Canyon,  the  April 
1986 U.S. air raid on 
-  -  Pattern  of 
international 




Wiretapping  -  Accurate  mapping 
of covert networks 
- 
TTSRL (2008)  In general terms: CT 
measures 
-  Radicalisation  - 




-  - 
Ullman (2006)  Various  -  -  Reduction  of  the 
threat of terrorism 
Listing according to output,- outcome- and impact-effectiveness by authors. 
 